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We model a two-stage duopolistic competition in a vertically differentiated eastern
market between the eastern and western firms. In the first stage firms compete in R&D,
and in the second stage in prices. Consumers in eastern market are distributed uniformly
according to their income, and purchase at most a single unit of the product. The R&D
activity improves the quality of the product. There are unilateral spillovers from the
western firm which produces the higher quality to the eastern firm which produces the
lower quality. The eastern firm can also imitate, to some degree, the western product.
We show that if (1) not all consumers have purchased the good initially, (2) the eastern
firm has a high rate of absorbing information out of the western firm, (3) the western firm
does no learn from the eastern firm, then no firm may have an incentive to deviate
unilaterally from the equilibrium in which the eastern firm is the leader an the western
firm is the follower. We compare this equilibrium with the one in which only the western
firm conducts R&D; the eastern firm increases the quality of its product solely through
imitation. We show that under assumptions (1)(3) listed above and for absorption rate
close to 1, the welfare level in the eastern country is higher when the eastern firm
imitates only compared to the welfare level in the leader-follower equilibrium.
5
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The exchange of technological information and know-how may take place on
bilateral and reciprocal basis and therefore may cause some industries to be
characterized by symmetric spillovers. However, in many cases such as newly created
industries or industries in different countries, technological know-how may differ
across firms. In such industries asymmetries are likely to be the rule rather than the
exception.
The asymmetric spillover approach seems especially useful in modelling R&D
competition in East European Countries. In such countries, domestic firms often use
old, inefficient technologies compared to western methods of production. Also
eastern firms do not have the financial resources to launch R&D [1]. Often in
industries characterized by high level of R&D (cars, electronics, drugs etc.), eastern
firms produce goods that are of significantly lower quality than imported western
goods. The eastern goods are aimed at poor customers whereas western goods are
more expensive and usually bought by wealthy customers. Hence, one can observe
segmentation of the market  the low quality market served by domestic firms and
high quality market served by foreign firms.
The market segmentation according to quality was studied in vertical product
differentiation models of oligopoly framework developed by Shaked and Sutton (1982,
1983, 1987), [see also Martin 1993, p.290]. In their model consumers purchase a
single unit of the product, the alternative branches of which differ in quality. The
defining characteristic of product differentiation is that, if any two varieties of the good
are offered at the same price, then all consumers choose the higher quality product.
Shaked and Sutton showed that if income differences between consumers are
sufficiently high, then in equilibrium more of one variety of the product will be
produced. Moreover, the richer the consumers are, the higher the quality they buy.
Contrary to Shaked and Sutton, we assume that qualities are exogenously given,
with the higher quality produced by foreign (western) firm and the lower quality
produced by domestic (eastern) firm. We assume that initially the qualities are too
low, compared with consumers income and the only way to increase the quality is to
invest in R&D. Thus, R&D investment improves the quality of the product, rather than
decreases costs as it is usually presumed in the R&D literature. We also assume that
6
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[1] See Schaffer (1991) and (1992) for description of the difficult financial situation of polish enterprises
during the transition period.only eastern firms benefit through spillovers from the R&D activity carried out by
western firm, thus we have unilateral spillovers [2]. The existence of unilateral
spillovers stems from the initial difference in qualities. The western producers are not
interested in absorbing technologies developed in the East since those technologies are
already 'old' in the West. On the other hand, eastern firms aim to develop a production
of high quality goods to catch up with the bigger part of the market and enjoy higher
profits. In the paper we also presume that the eastern firm is able to increase the
quality of its product through imitation of the western technology; the degree of
imitation is proportional to the difference of qualities. Hence, if the initial quality
produced by firm i is qi and firm i spends ri on R&D, then the increase of quality is
qi qi + b(q2 – q1 ) + br2 + r1
for eastern firm 1 and
q2 q2 + r2
for western firm 2 (where parameter 0 £ b £ 1 is a level of unilateral spillovers from
foreign to eastern firm). The term b(q2  q1) measures degree of imitation of the
western product by the eastern firm [3].
Our approach is closely related to the model presented by De Bondt and
Henrique (1995) who analyze the asymmetric spillovers in duopolistic framework.
The asymmetric spillovers in their model stem from the fact that one firm has initially
lower costs than the other. De Bondt and Henrique model asymmetries in the
strategic investment game as differences in initial costs, differences in marginal costs
of R&D expenditures, and differences in spillovers.
In the paper we analyze three versions of the model. In the first version both firms
make their decisions concerning R&D levels simultaneously. As a result we obtain
Nash equilibrium R&D levels.
Second version involves one firm being a Stackelberg leader and another firm a
Stackelberg follower in their R&D competition. Then we analyze the announcement
game in which both rivals can choose to be a leader or a follower. The intuition
suggests that such a game should have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the
7
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 32  Unilateral ...
[2] Unilateral spillovers with cost-reducing R&D investment are analyzed in Zigiæ (1998).
[3] The competition with imitation in a vertically differentiated market was analyzed by Pepall (1997).
Pepall assumes that the imitation is costly, with the lower costs of imitation, the higher is product differentiation.
Moreover, the follower is able to choose the degree of imitation.
­
­foreign firm as the leader who invest heavily in R&D and increases the quality of its
product. In such a equilibrium the domestic firm should benefit from being the
follower who imitates the foreign product through spillovers.
Contrary to the intuition, we show that usually the announcement game has not a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Only in one case, in which (1) the eastern firm
absorbs relatively large spillovers (b > 1/3), and (2) some consumers with the lowest
income do not purchase the good initially, the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium both firms enjoy higher profits than in
simultaneous move game equilibrium. A leader in this equilibrium is the eastern firm
that produces the lower quality good. In the announcement game equilibrium the
eastern firm (a leader) invests less in R&D than it would if both rivals were to have
chosen their R&D level simultaneously. On the other hand, the western firm (a
follower) invests more in R&D than it would if both rivals were to have chosen their
R&D level simultaneously. Those results stem from the fact that for large enough
spillovers, the eastern firm benefits form the larger R&D level of the foreign firm.
Therefore it reduces its own R&D level to free ride on the larger R&D investments of
the western firm. The western firm moves second and it is hurt by the eastern firm'
R&D level. Consequently, it welcomes the lower effort of the domestic firm and, in
response, increases its own efforts.
The announcement game with a choice of leader-follower role is also analyzed by
De Bondt and Henrique (1995). They find that a such a game has a unique equilibrium
in a case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other, at most, is able to
receive only small spillovers. The leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the
large spillovers. Other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in R&D do not affect
this outcome. Our results confirm De Bondt and Henrique finding in this respect that
asymmetry in spillovers is crucial in determining a leader and a follower in the
announcement game equilibrium. However, we add the additional condition that the
leading firm, which produces the product of lower quality and which has high
absorption rate, should face a potential increase in demand from consumers who did
not purchase the product yet.
The third variation of the model assumes that the eastern firm increases the
quality of its product only through imitation, without conducting any R&D. The
western firm, knowing the degree of imitation, chooses the R&D level appropriately.
Thus, the western firm is a leader who anticipates an increase of quality of the eastern
firm. We show that in this equilibrium, the level of R&D investment of the western
firm is higher compared to the level chosen in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in which the eastern firm is a leader. As a result, the western firm offers the higher
8
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equilibrium of the announcement game. Moreover, the western product is sold for
higher price than in announcement game.
The welfare comparisons of the regime in which (1) the eastern firm absorbs
relatively large spillovers (b > 1/3), and (2) some consumers with the lowest income
do not purchase the good initially, show the following results. If the absorption rate is
relatively small (i.e., close to 1/3), then it is more likely that the highest welfare in the
eastern country is achieved in simultaneous game equilibrium; the lowest welfare
occurs in the situation when the eastern firm imitates the western one. For very high
absorption rate (i.e., close to 1), it is more likely that the highest welfare in the eastern
country is achieved in the situation when the eastern firm achieves higher quality
solely through imitation; the lowest welfare occurs in the simultaneous game
equilibrium.
The obtained results show the importance of R&D investments for the eastern
firms which produce the goods of the lower quality. Even if the firm is able to absorb
the western technology through spillovers and imitations, and there is a room for
'free-riding', it is still crucial from the social point of view that some R&D investments
should be conducted. The only case when simple imitation gives the highest welfare
results in the eastern country, is the unlikely situation of very high imitation rate.
2. The Model
For the sake of simplicity, assume that there are only two countries 'East' and
'West'. There is only one firm in each country. The eastern (domestic) firm 1 sells only
in domestic country 'East' and may conduct R&D. The western (foreign) firm 2
operates in both countries and is supposed to conduct R&D.
Both firm produce a good which can be characterized by different quality. The
domestic firm 1 has a constant marginal cost c1 and produces good of quality q1. The
foreign firm 2 with constant marginal costs c2 makes a good of quality q2. We assume
that a quality of foreign product is higher then domestic one: q2 > q1.
All consumers in eastern country are uniformly distributed according to income t
on the interval [ t , t ]. Every consumer purchases at most one unit of the good. If
consumer with income t does not purchase the good, his utility is t. If consumer with
income t purchase the good from the domestic producer for the price p1, his utility is
q1 + a1(t – p1) where a1 > 1. For a consumer who buys the good made by the foreign
firm for a price p2, the utility is q2 + a2(t – p2) where a2 > a1. Thus, for given qualities
9
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 32  Unilateral ...q1 and prices p1, the consumer purchases (or not) the product in order to achieve the
highest from three utilities:
t, q1 + a1 (t – p1),   q2 + a2(t – p2).
Henceforth, to make the model tractable, we will assume that a2 – a1 = a1 – 1 = K > 0,
and that marginal costs ci are equal to zero.
The R&D expenditures increase quality of the goods made by the firms. Thus, if
firm i spends ri on R&D then increases of qualities are:
q1 q1 +r1 + br2 + b(q2 – ql ), and  q2 q2 + r2 (1)
where 0 £ b £ 1 is a level of unilateral spillover and imitation from foreign to domestic
firm. We will further examine a two-stage game. In the first stage, both firms choose
their R&D expenditures ri, in the second stage the firms compete in prices pi. We will
analyze the game backward, starting from the second stage.
2.1. The Second Stage: Price Competition
As usual in location models, we will look for a "marginal consumer'. Consider first
the consumer with income t1 who is indifferent between not purchasing and
purchasing from domestic producer. We have
t1 = q1 + a1(t1 – p1) (2)
and
t1 =    (a1p1 – q1). (3)
Analogously, consider a consumer with income t2 who is indifferent between
purchasing between domestic and foreign product.
We have
q1 + a1(t2 – p1) = q2 + a2(t2 – p2) (4)
and
t2 =  (a2p2 – q2 – a1p1  + q1). (5) 
10





KWe have to distinguish two situations.
l. When  t 1 > t, consumers with income less than t 1 do not purchase the product at
all. Profits of the firm 1 are
P1 = p1 (t2 – t 1). (6)
2. For t1 £ t t , all consumers purchase the product. Profits of the firm 1 are
P1 = p1 (t2 – t). (7)
In both cases profits of the firm 2 are given by:
P2 = p2 (t – t2). (8)
First case:  t1 > t
Consider the first possibility, when t 1 > t. The first-order conditions for Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium are
dP1 dP2
``` dp1 ``` dp2 (9)






Substituting (3), (5), (10) and (11) into the profit functions and using first-order
conditions (9) we obtain:
2a1 a2 (12)
``` K ``` K
Hence, in equilibrium, profits are quadratic in prices.
11
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= 0   and = 0.
p1 = (3q1 – q2 + Kt),
p2 = (3q2 – 2q1 + 4Kt).
P1 = p2
1 and P2 = p2
2 .12
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 32  A. Baniak
Second case: t1 £ £ t
For  t1 £ t, first-order condition for the domestic firm is
dP1 dt2 1 (13)
``` dp1 ``` dp1 ``K






Substituting prices (14) and (15) into the profit functions we again obtain that profits
are quadratic in prices:
a1 a2 (16)
``` K ``` K
The first stage: competition in R&D
We will study now the competition in R&D expenditures game. We will distinguish
two possible scenarios. First, both firms are engaged in R&D and they make their
strategic investment decisions independently and simultaneously. Second, both firms
are engaged in R&D with the one firm as a leader and the second firm as a follower.
Simultaneous R&D competition
The levels of R&D are chosen to maximize
qi (17)
``` 2
where the cost of R&D to firm i is given by        . The cost of R&D is assumed to be
quadratic, reflecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures. The
parameter qi measures the degree of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures. The
= p1 + t2 – t = (– 2a1p1 + a2p2 – q2 + q1 – Kt) = 0.
p1 = (q1 – q2 + Kt– Kt),
p2 = (q2 – q1 + 2Kt – Kt).
P1 = p2
1 and P2 = p2
2 .




ihigher qi is, the higher is the degree of diminishing returns for firm i.
First case: t 1 > t




0 is the initial level of prices given by (10) and q1
0 are initial levels of qualities. 
The parameter                              is positive by the second-order condition. 
The slope of the reaction function (18) is
(19)
hence, the level of spillover determines whether the domestic firm 1 treats R&D
expenditures as strategic substitutes or complements. For small values of b (i.e.,
b < 1/3) R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes in the sense that a decrease in
the foreign firm R&D expenditures increases the equilibrium choice of the domestic
firm (see Fig.1); for large enough values of b (i.e., b > 1/3), they are strategic
complements in the sense that a decrease in the foreign firm R&D expenditures
decreases the equilibrium choice of the domestic firm [4] (see Fig. 2).
Analogously, from first-order condition dV2/dr2 = 0 we obtain reaction function
(20)
where p2
0 is the initial level of prices given by (11) and                                        .
From second-order condition we know that G2 is positive.
The slope of the reaction function (20) is
(21)
thus, foreign firm 2 always treats R&D expenditure as a strategic substitute.
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[4] For a distinction between conventional substitutes and complements, and strategic substitutes and
complements see Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).





where W1 = G1G2 + 2(1 – 3b) > 0 [5]. We will denote the levels of profits in this
equilibrium by Vi
N.
Second case:  t 1 £ £ t
From the first-order condition dV1/dr1 = 0 we get reaction function
(24)
where                           is positive by second-order condition.
Analogously, from condition dV2 /dr2 = 0 we have reaction function
(25)
where                                    is positive by second-order condition.
Note that the slopes of reaction functions (24) and (25) are negative. Hence, both
firms always treat R&D expenditures as strategic substitutes.
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[5] The condition W1>0 ensures stability of equilibrium, i.e., own effects dominate cross-effects.where W2 = F1F2 – (1 – b) is assumed to be positive.
As before, we will denote the levels of profits in this equilibrium by Vi
N.
Sequential R&D competition
Given the best response functions [equations (22), (23), (26) and (27)], it is possible
to compute the sequential announcement equilibria with firm i leading and firm j
following The leader maximizes the following:
subject to (28)
We will denote the solution to the problem (28) by ri
L, the corresponding choice for
firm j is rj
F = rj(ri
L). The values of profits for problem (28) are denoted by Vi
L and Vj
F.
We are now able to compare the profits of the firms using graphical argumentation.
The crucial factors in determining the comparison of simultaneous and sequential moves
are slopes of the best response functions. In our analysis we follow Dowrick (1986), see
also Gal-Or (1985). We are mostly interested in the circumstances in which both rivals
benefit from sequential investment announcements:
Proposition 1. The leader-follower announcement (with the domestic firm as a leader





N) if and only if:
l. Some consumers do not purchase the product initially, i.e., t 1 > t and,
2. The rate of absorption for domestic firm is high enough, i.e., b > 1/3.
PROOF, see Appendix.
The interesting aspect of proposition 1 is that for existence of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in the announcement game, it is not enough to the domestic firm
have the high absorption rate. There should be also some consumers who did not
purchase the good yet. Those consumers are potential clients of the domestic firm.
Hence, if the domestic firm increases quality of its product or decreases price, it
expands in both directions: firstly, it takes away some relatively wealthy consumers
from foreign firm. Secondly it attracts some relatively poor consumers who did not
purchase the product before.
15
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a domestic firm as a follower) is:








PROOF,  see Appendix.
Suppose that both firms announce simultaneously their desired role in the sequence
(leader-follower or simultaneous) just before they commit to their R&D activities. If the
firms announce the same role, they choose the simultaneous strategies. If different roles
are announced, each firm implements the corresponding sequential strategy.
We can see that this announcement game has a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium that involves the domestic firm leading and the foreign firm following as
described in proposition 1 (i.e., with b > 1/3 and t > t) . Given that the domestic firm
is leading, the foreign firm, which had announced that it would be following, would not
retract, since by doing so it would be made worse off (i.e., simultaneous strategy will
result in lower profits for the firm). Similarly, the domestic firm, given that the foreign
firm is following, cannot improve upon its leadership announcement.
In order to characterize the importance of above results, it is useful to look at
some of the implication of sequential moves.
Proposition 3. Sequential R&D investments that improve profits of both rivals (as
described in Prop. 1) are such that:
l. The western firm (a follower) invests more in R&D and charges a higher price than






2. The eastern firm (a leader) invests less in R&D than it would if both firms were to
have chosen their R&D level simultaneously, i.e., r1
L < r1
N;
3. If the absorption rate is high, i.e., close to I then it is more likely that the eastern
firm (a leader) will charge lower price than it would if both firms were to choose their R&D
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the eastern firm (a leader) will charge higher price than it would if both firms were to




The intuition behind the proposition 3 is as follows. If domestic firms absorbs
sufficiently large spillovers (b > 1/3) it actually benefits from the larger R&D level of
the foreign firm. Therefore it reduces its own R&D to free-ride on larger R&D
investments of the foreign firm.
The foreign firm moves second and it is hurt by the domestic firm' R&D level.
Consequently, it welcomes the lower effort of the domestic firm and, in response
increases its own efforts.
Imitation by the Eastern Firm
Consider now situation in which the eastern firm does not conduct any R&D and
increases the quality of its product only by imitating the quality produced by the
western firm with the degree of imitation equal to b. In such a situation, the western
firm moves first by choosing its R&D level and knowing the degree of imitation b.
Hence, the western firm has a first move advantage. In the second stage of the game
firms compete in prices. In what follows, we concentrate on the most interesting case
in which (1) not all consumers are served, i.e., t 1 > t and, (2) the absorption rate is high
enough, i.e, b > 1/3.
From the first-order condition dV2 /dr2 = 0 we obtain the optimal level of the R&D
expenditures for the western firm:
(29)
The comparison of the expenditure levels and prices of western product under
different regimes leads to the following result.
Proposition 4. If the western firm while choosing its R&D level knows that the eastern
firm is going only to imitate, without conducting any R&D, then:
l. The western firm invests more in R&D and charges a higher price than it would if
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firm will charge lower price than it would if both firms were to choose their R&D level
sequentially (as described in Prop. 1), i.e., p1
I < p1
L.
3. If the absorption rate is relatively low, i.e., close to 1/3 then it is more likely that
the eastern firm will charge higher price than it would if both firms were to choose their
R&D level sequentially (as described in Prop. 1), i.e., p1
I > p1
L.
We can see that the western firm enjoys the highest profits, charges the highest price
and invests the most in R&D if it knows that the eastern firm will only imitate the
western product. We can say that the western firm has quasi-monopolistic position in
the market.
Welfare Analysis
Let us compare the change of welfare in the domestic country under the three
regimes described above. The welfare in the domestic country is given by
(30)
After simple manipulations we obtain from (30):
(31)
When we move along the reaction function (20) from point (0, r2
I ) through point
(r1
L , r2
F) until the point (r1
N , r2
N) (see Fig. 2), then r1increases and p2decreases (by
Prop. 3 and 4). Hence, the last two expressions in the right-hand side of (31) move in
opposite directions. By Lemma 1 (see Appendix), for high value of b it is more likely
that t1 will decrease, and for low value of b (close to 1/3) it is more likely that t1 will
increase. Hence, we can say that:
Proposition 5. The comparison of welfare levels in the eastern country when:
l. Some consumers do not purchase the product initially, i.e.,  t 1 > tand, 
2. The rate of absorption for domestic firm is high enough, i.e., b > 1/3,
shows that:
18
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that the highest level of welfare is achieved when the eastern firm increases its quality  
only through imitation. In this case the lowest level of welfare is obtained if both firms
choose their R&D level simultaneously. In other words:
(b) if the value of absorption rate b is relatively small (i.e, close to 1/3), then it is more 
likely that the highest level of welfare is achieved when both firms choose their 
R&D level simultaneously. In this case the lowest level of welfare is obtained if the  
eastern firm increases its quality only through imitation. In other words:
The important conclusion from the Prop. 5 is that the lack of R&D expenditures of the
eastern firm (equilibrium with imitation only) may lead to the welfare improvement
compared to some degree of R&D ('leader-follower' equilibrium, or Nash equilibrium)
only when the absorption rate is close to l. This is rather unlikely situation. Therefore,
from the social point of view, it is crucial for the western firm to conduct R&D
investments.
3. Conclusions
We model a two-stage competition in a vertically differentiated market between the
eastern and western firms in which in the first stage firm compete in R&D activities
and in the second stage they compete in prices. Within the context of simple duopoly
setting with quadratic payoffs and unilateral spillovers (from the western firm which
produces the higher quality to the eastern firm which produces the lower quality), it
appears that the intensity of spillovers and the existence of consumers who did not
purchase the good, play a crucial role in determining the simultaneous or sequential
nature of R&D efforts. If not all consumers purchase the good initially and the
domestic firm, that is good at absorbing information out of the foreign firm leads, and
the foreign firm which does no learn from the domestic firm at all follows, then no
firm may have an incentive to deviate unilaterally.
We also compared the announcement game equilibrium with the equilibrium in
which the eastern firm increases the quality solely through imitation. The welfare
19
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welfare level in domestic country higher under 'imitation' regime than under 'leader-
follower' regime. Thus, it is extremely important for the eastern firm to conduct R&D
activity, even if it can imitate the western product.
It is not clear to what extent the obtained results are robust to the other
specifications of the model. In general, any changes to the model that affect the signs
of cross-derivatives needed to determine the slope of the reaction curves in R&D
space will influence the outcome of our results.
In closing we mention some research areas that require further consideration.
The first area centres around the welfare implication of our model. It is not
entirely clear which regime produces the highest social welfare level in the domestic
country.
The tariff policy in eastern countries tend to protect the domestic producers from
the competition of high quality and cheap foreign products. It would be interesting to
examine the effects of tariffs imposed on high quality imported products on behaviour
of both competitors and on the social welfare level in domestic country. In particular
we may ask if there is any optimal tariff policy which maximizes the social welfare in
the domestic country.
One can observe big changes of income structure in East European Countries.
Generally the average level of income increases but the income inequalities become
higher. In terms of our stylized model it would mean that both t and t increase, but t
increases more rapidly. The impact of such a change of structure of the income on
duopolists behaviour remains to be seen.
Usually the western firms who sell its products in eastern countries also operate
on the western markets. This means that western markets are the principal areas of
R&D competition for those firms, eastern market playing only a secondary role. We
think that the concentration in R&D competition in the western markets can lead to
the R&D level which is too high from the point of view of competition in the eastern
market. One can ask what are the policy and welfare implications of such an over-
investment in R&D in eastern market.
20
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Proof of Prop. 14
We prove Prop. 14 for the case  t 1 > t and b > 1/3; for the other cases the proof
is analogous (see Fig. 1 and 2).
Change of r1
First-order condition for problem (28) (with i = 1) is
(32)
We have
Hence, for b > 1/3, we can rewrite (32) as
(33)
where A is a positive constant. We see that r1
L is a solution of the linear system of
equations (33)-(20). Note that the only difference between (18) and (33) is the
constant A. Since r1





If we are moving along the reaction function (20), the differential dV2 is equal to





From (11) we know that Dp2 = 0 if and only if (3 – 2b)r2 – 2b(q2
0 – q1
0) – 2r1 = 0,





I) lie on the
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From (10) we know that Dp1 = 0 if and only if 3b(q2
0 – q1
0) + (3b – 1)r2 + 3r1= 0,
i.e., if dr2 /dr1 = –3/(3b – 1) < 0. The comparison of the slope of the line Dp1 = 0 and
the slope of the reaction function (20) in the space (r1, r2) shows that the Dp1 = 0 line
is steeper [flatter] than the reaction function (20) if and only if
3G2 > [<]2 (3b – 1). (34)
We are not able to say for which values of b Î (1/3, 1) the inequality (34) is true. 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to check that the expression                is increasing with
an increase of b. Therefore, for high values of b (close to 1), it is more likely that the




N. Analogously, for relatively small values of b (close to 1/3), it is more likely that the





We will now examine the change of t1 in different equilibria
Lemma 1. Under the regime described in Prop. l:











From (2) we know that Dt1 = a1Dp1 – Dq1= 0 if and only if dr2 /dr1 = – 4/(4b+1)
< 0. The comparison of the slope of the line Dt1 = 0 and the slope of the reaction
function (20) in the space (r1, r2) shows that the Dt1 = 0 line is steeper [flatter] than
the reaction function (20) if and only if
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We are not able to say for which values of b Î (1/3, 1), the inequality (35) is true.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to compute that the expression             is increasing 
with an increase of b. Therefore, for high values of b (close to 1), it is more likely that




N. Analogously, for relatively small values of b (close to 1/3), it is more likely that the
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